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Abstract
The equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) can be expressed as the sum of both
"internal dividends" and "external losses" for a given transferable utility (TU) game.
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Let N be a player set. Harsanyi (1963) argued that when a coalition S in
N forms, then the two complementary coalitions S and N \ S form and
they make conﬂicting threats each other in order to get their maximal
proﬁts. Also Harsanyi introduced the notion of “internal dividend”. He
argued that when a coalition S forms, then every member of S is inﬂu-
enced by S. Hence, every member of S can receive an internal dividend
from S. The ﬁnal payoﬀ of a given player i will be the sum of the internal
dividends to i from all coalitions of which he is a member. The Shapley
value (1953) exactly refers to such a formula.
In this note, we consider a more complicated situation. Namely, when
a coalition S forms, then every member of S is inﬂuenced not only by
S but also by its complement N \ S. So, when coalition S forms, every
member of S can receive an internal dividend from S. Also he can receive
a speciﬁc amount from N \ S, which we name “external loss”. The ﬁnal
payoﬀ of a given player i will be the sum of both the internal dividends
to i from all coalitions of which he is a member and the external losses to
i from all coalitions of which he is not a member. Interesting, the equal
allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) refers to such a formula. ∗
2 Preliminaries
Let U be the universe of players. A coalition is a non-empty ﬁnite subset
of U. Let N be a coalition and let I R be the set of real numbers, the
cardinality of N is denoted by |N|.
A transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N,v), where N is a coalition
and v : 2N → I R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. Let G
denote the set of all TU games. We call S a subcoalition if S is a subset
of N. (S,v) denotes a subgame of (N,v) obtained by restricting v to
subsets of S only.
Recall some facts for the Shapley value. The Shapley value φ is the
function on G that assigns to each TU game (N,v) a vector φ(N,v) in





(|S \ {i}|!)(|N \ S|!)
|N|!
(v(S) − v(S \ {i})).
∗The EANSC emerged originally in the cost-sharing literature. Later, Straﬃn and
Heaney (1981), and Moulin (1985) investigated it on the class of TU games. Specially,
Moulin (1985) introduced a reduced game in the context of quasi-linear cost allocation
problems to characterize EANSC.
1Deﬁnition 1 A dividend function on G is a function d assigns to each






for all S ⊆ N, where d∅(N,v) = 0.
It is well-known that for T ⊆ N, dT(N,v) can be interpreted to
be “internal dividend” allocated by coalition T to its members, and
dT(S,v) = dT(N,v) for T ⊆ S ⊆ N. For convenience, we use nota-
tion dT = dT(S,v) = dT(N,v) for T ⊆ S ⊆ N.† A remarkable result for
the Shapley value is as follows.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique dividend function on G. Moreover,
the Shapley value can be expressed as the sum of internal dividends for a







In this section, we show that EANSC can be expressed as the sum of both
“internal dividends” and “external losses” for a given TU game. First,
we introduce the deﬁnition of EANSC and a dividend-loss function. It is
known that the EANSC ϕ of TU games can be given the following simple
game theoretic formulation:
ϕi(N,v) = v(N) − v(N \ {i}) + 1
|N|[v(N) −
P
k∈N v(N) − v(N \ {k})]
= 1
|N|{v(N) − (|N| − 1)v(N \ {i}) +
P
k∈N\{i} v(N \ {k})}.
†Let (N,uN




1 , if T ⊆ S
0 , otherwise.
It is well-known that each TU game (N,v) can be expressed as a linear com-










2Deﬁnition 2 A dividend-loss function on G is a function D assigns to











T (N,v) + D
−
T (N,v) (Eﬃciency), (2)
for all S ⊆ N, and
D
+
T (N,v) + D
−
T (N,v) = |T| D
+




for all T ⊆ N, where D
+
∅ (N,v) = D
−
∅ (N,v) = 0.
The condition (2) can be referred to the eﬃciency property. As to
condition (3), we image that when a coalition T forms, then
1. T possesses both the internal dividend “D
+
T (N,v)” and the external
loss “D
−
T (N,v)”, hence, the sum is “D
+
T (N,v) + D
−
T (N,v)”
2. T allocates “D
+
T (N,v)” to its every member as internal dividend
3. T allocates “−D
−
T (N,v)” to every member in N \ T as external
loss.
These mean that “|T| D
+
T (N,v)” is the sum of internal dividends and
“−|N \ T| D
−
T (N,v)” is the sum of external losses. Hence, the left part
of the equality in condition (3) can be interpreted as the amount of
“supply” when a coalition T forms; and the right part is referred to the
amount of “demand” when a coalition T forms. The condition (3) means
that supply is equal to demand. Note that D
+





T (S,v) 6= D
−
T (N,v) for T ⊆ S ⊆ N in general.
Theorem 2 There exists a unique dividend-loss function on G. More-
over, the EANSC can be expressed as the sum of both internal dividends
and external losses for a given TU game. That is, let (N,v) ∈ G and























|N| |T|dT, then it is easy to verify that there exists a unique
dividend-loss function on G, we omit it.
3To verify the expression, let T ⊆ N, by substituting v(T) with P
K⊆T |K|dK to the formulation of the EANSC of (N,v), we obtain that
ϕi(N,v) = 1
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